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“V.I.P.” VIDEOGRAPHER INTIMIDATION PROTECTION: 
HOW THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROTECT CITIZENS 
WHO VIDEOTAPE THE POLICE 
David Murphy* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With each passing day, more incidents involving police officers, 
private citizens, and video cameras are emerging on the Internet, 
making the news, and sometimes appearing on civil and criminal 
dockets.1  When individuals bring these incidents to public attention, 
more people seek to record police activity, which creates more 
opportunities for police officers to intimidate videographers.2  On 
YouTube, an Internet user can watch hours of uploaded footage 
showing police officers aggressively confronting videographers.3  
These encounters raise questions about police conduct and private 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.B.A. Information 
Technology Management, 2010, University of Notre Dame.  Special thanks to my 
parents, Susan and John Murphy, for their persistent encouragement and support. 
 1  See, e.g., Hinhin2, Good Cops, Doing Their Job, Professionally, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sylrpLhG4w0&NR=1; DanceRooster, How 
To Invoke Your Rights With the Police, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0En_sdsyh1M&feature=related; RidleyReport, 
NH: What to Do When Cops Order Camera Shutoff?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 13, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLSptMe3yw0&feature=related; Acumensch, Film 
Is Not A Crime, YOUTUBE (Mar. 7, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMDW4Fszj2U.   
 2  See sources cited supra note 1.  The titles of these videos and related posts on 
the internet indicate that at least some private citizens are actively filling the role of 
providing public oversight of police conduct.  As “how to” and other oversight videos 
continue to be uploaded and accumulate views, the number of videos being 
produced will likely rise, thus increasing the likelihood of confrontations with police 
over the use of the video camera. 
 3  See, e.g., Ccpafl, Cop Watcher Arrested While Filming Police, YOUTUBE (May 9, 
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_8Bv0wNgCY&feature=related; 
RTAmerica, Woman Arrested for Filming Police, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtJpL2ZdWVI; HellandKeller, Police vs. Civilians 
w/ Video Camera, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_U1oFcCAZo&feature=related.  By using 
keywords like “police,” “intimidation,” and “camera” in the search query, users can 
endlessly watch videos of confrontations between private citizens and police officers 
regarding the use of video cameras. 
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citizens’ rights to film police.  Several courts, police departments, and 
legal scholars have addressed these questions, but have failed to 
reach a consensus as to the legality and practicality of protecting 
videographers from police intimidation.4  So, the power to protect 
individuals and their rights to film police officers lies in the hands of 
state legislatures. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently 
addressed some of these questions in Glik v. Cunniffe.5  In Glik, Boston 
police officers arrested Simon Glik for using his cellular phone’s 
digital video camera to film several police officers arresting a young 
man.6  Glik was subsequently charged with violations of 
Massachusetts’s Anti-Wiretapping Statute7 and two other state-law 
offenses, which the Court ultimately deemed baseless and thereby 
dismissed.8  In doing so, the First Circuit held that the defendant 
police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from Glik’s 
constitutional claims because Glik had “clearly established First 
Amendment rights in filming the officers in public space.”9 
Glik demonstrates that the First Circuit is willing to defend a First 
Amendment right to videotape police officers.  But not all courts 
extend a public right to film police officers, and the precise source of 
the right to film police within the First Amendment is somewhat 
elusive.10  Arguably, the law is leaning in the direction of “protecting” 
individuals who film police officers in public, but police officers may 
be actively suppressing the use of video cameras to record police 
conduct.11  If a First Amendment right to film police officers exists, or 
at least ought to exist, then state legislatures must protect 
videographers from overreaching police intimidation. 
This Comment discusses police intimidation of videographers 
and provides a legislative model that protects videographers who film 
police conduct.  Part II discusses how filming police in public is 
protected First Amendment activity.  Part III exposes how the current 
legal environment incentivizes police officers to intimidate 
videographers who attempt to film police conduct.  Part IV 
 
 4  See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
 5  Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 6  Id. 
 7  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000). 
 8  Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
 9  Id. at 85. 
 10  See infra Part II. 
 11  See infra Part II. 
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scrutinizes the current framework of deterrents designed to prevent 
police misconduct and discusses why these safeguards fail to protect 
videographers.  Part V recommends a bright-line rule that imposes 
harsh punishments to effectively deter police officers from 
intimidating law-abiding videographers who capture police conduct 
on camera.  Lastly, Part VI will conclude this discussion. 
II.  FILMING POLICE OFFICERS IN PUBLIC AND FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION 
This section provides an overview of the ambiguous First 
Amendment right to film police in public and discusses how legal 
and academic consensus is trending towards enhancing protection 
for videographers.  Some courts have already held that the First 
Amendment protects filming police officers, but these courts have 
failed to precisely explain this right’s origins and limitations.12  Other 
courts, however, have not recognized a broad right to film police 
within the First Amendment.13  Despite this dissonance, a First 
Amendment right to film police officers in public will likely be 
recognized in the future based on recent court decisions and legal 
scholarship.14 
 
 12  See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that an Illinois eavesdropping statute “likely violates the First Amendment’s free-
speech and free-press guarantees”);  Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs “had a First Amendment right, subject to 
reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police 
conduct,” and that the First Amendment “protects the right to gather information 
about what public officials do on public property,” but failing to clearly elaborate 
where in the First Amendment such a powerful right exists); State v. Graber, No. 12-
K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *33–34 (Md. Cir. Sept. 27, 2010) (“[S]tatutes 
which implicate the free speech protections of the First Amendment must be 
narrowly construed.”); but see Ramos v. Flowers, No. A-4910-10T3, 2012 WL 4208699, 
at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2012) (“A documentary about a subject of 
public interest, such as urban gangs, is a form of investigative journalism, and the 
process of preparing such a documentary is a form of news gathering.  For that 
reason, those activities are protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution . . . .”). 
 13  See, e.g., Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 
n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (explaining that the act of photographing, by itself, is not 
sufficiently communicative and therefore not subject to First Amendment protection, 
regardless of whether or not the subject is a public servant). 
 14  Cf. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586–87; Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 
2011).  See generally Caycee Hampton, Case Comment: Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v. 
Cunniffe and the Paradox of Citizen Recording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549 (2011); Seth F. 
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the 
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 392–403 (2011); Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police 
Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow For the 
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In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”15  Although Glik lacked direct reference to the 
language of the First Amendment, it recognized an “unambiguous” 
right to gather and disseminate information related to matters of 
public interest, especially police conduct.16  Likewise, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that First Amendment protection extends 
beyond the press, and defends individuals like Glik in regard to 
gathering public information.17 
But precisely how the First Amendment affords such protection 
is not clearly established.18  In Glik, First Circuit Judge Lipez remarked 
that “the First Amendment’s aegis extends further than the text’s 
proscription on laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press,’ and encompasses a range of conduct” related to information 
gathering and dissemination.19  To connect these principles to the 
filming of police officers in public, the court declared that “[t]he 
filming of . . . police officers performing their responsibilities” is a 
“cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting” 
information gathering, dissemination, and “free discussion of 
government affairs.”20  The court easily categorized Glik’s activity as 
 
Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.  981 (2009); Howard W. 
Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. 
REV. 600 (2009). 
 15  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16  Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (“[T]hough not unqualified, a citizen’s right to film 
government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their 
duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-established liberty safeguarded by 
the First Amendment.”). 
 17  See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82 (1972). 
 18  See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.  In opinions such as Fordyce, the court merely glanced 
over “the First Amendment right to film matters of public interest” without 
sufficiently explaining from where the right is derived.  Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 
F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 19  Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting Belotti, 435 U.S. at 783) (extending the First 
Amendment’s reach in Glik by attributing that it “goes beyond protection of the press 
and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock 
of information from which members of the public may draw”). 
 20  Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see also Smith v. City 
of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Blackston v. Alabama, 30 
F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994)) ( “The First Amendment protects the right to gather 
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a 
right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439. 
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information gathering and dissemination, but it failed to clearly 
indicate why that activity was actually protected by the First 
Amendment.21  Circuit Judge Lipez vigorously supported his position 
with case law like Smith v. City of Cumming and Fordyce v. City of Seattle.22  
Upon closer inspection, however, those Supreme Court opinions 
merely addressed a videographer’s First Amendment rights in 
passing, and failed to precisely derive the source of protection from 
the language of the First Amendment.23  The majority of the sources 
used in Glik are somewhat ambiguous as to how the right to film 
matters of public concern is actually protected First Amendment 
activity.24 
One source, however, provides more specific insight as to how 
the filming of police officers is protected First Amendment activity.  
Glik cited Robinson v. Fetterman, which held that individuals have a free-
speech right to film police officers in the course of their public 
activities.25  By at least referencing the Speech Clause,26 the court in 
Robinson modestly provided some legitimate constitutional support 
for what Glik would ultimately declare to be a “clearly-established” 
First Amendment right to film police officers in public.27 
Branching off from the Speech Clause, some legal scholars have 
more thoroughly examined the existence of a First Amendment right 
 
 21  See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. 
 22  Id. at 83 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439).  Amongst 
others cited to support the proposition that “the First Amendment protects the 
filming of government officials in public spaces” are Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 
F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), and Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465 (D.N.H. 
1990). 
 23  Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (where the plaintiffs allege that police harassed them 
for filming police activity, the court merely stated that it “agreed” that the plaintiffs 
had a First Amendment right and provided no further First Amendment analysis).  
See generally Fordyce, 55 F.3d 436 (this opinion does not discuss the merits of a First 
Amendment right to film but merely rejects the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment since a genuine issue of material fact existed in regard to whether the 
plaintiff’s rights were violated when police seized and smashed his camera). 
 24  See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.11); Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36 (1991); Mills, 384 U.S. at 218). 
 25  Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) 
(“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public 
dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence . . . .  [T]here can be no doubt 
that the free speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped 
the [police officers].”). 
 26  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech”). 
 27  Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
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to film police officers.28  The right to gather and disseminate 
information may be derived from three elements within the First 
Amendment: the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech”); the Press Clause (“or of the 
press”); and the Petition Clause (“the right of the people . . . to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances”).29  The Speech 
Clause protects the direct dissemination of speech—”dissemination” 
may be the speech itself or conduct that necessarily facilitates the 
speech.30  Similarly, the Press Clause is interpreted to protect 
reasonable conduct antecedent to expression, such as legitimate 
means of news gathering.31  Lastly, the Petition Clause protects 
information gathering for private citizens seeking the resolution of 
legal disputes and for the general purposes of self-governance.32 
Conceivably, filming police officers could satisfy all three First 
Amendment clauses that form the right to gather and disseminate 
information.  Hypothetically, a videographer could decide to make a 
documentary about the state of law enforcement in his community by 
video-recording the local police on duty.  The videographer’s 
commentary about law enforcement would be the “speech” itself in 
satisfaction of the Speech Clause and, absent additional conduct 
warranting police intervention, would be facially reasonable.33  The 
Press Clause would protect the actual act of filming the police officers 
in public because it is a necessary and common means of news 
gathering.34  Lastly, since a documentary could comment on law 
 
 28  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 665. 
 29  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 30  ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797–99 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 31  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the 
significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country’s welfare.  Nor is it 
suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; 
without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.”); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: 
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
249, 354 (2004) (noting that the Speech Clause and Press Clause may not even be 
separate sources of the right to disseminate information, but the traditional press’s 
news gathering conduct receives extensive First Amendment protection). 
 32  See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011); Sure-Tan, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896–97 (1984); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 
483 (1985) (“The values in the right of petition as an important aspect of self-
government are beyond question.”). 
 33  See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Taking 
photographs at a public event is a facially innocent act.”). 
 34  See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The act of 
making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to 
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enforcement, the film would have a general purpose for self-
governance, thus satisfying the Petition Clause.35  Albeit somewhat 
simplistic, this model illustrates how filming police is activity 
protected directly by the language of the First Amendment itself. 
Alternatively, instead of focusing on a right to gather and 
disseminate information, some scholars argue that a right to film 
police officers can be derived from “freedom of expression.”36  For 
instance, captured images from photography or video-recording can 
be “like words inscribed on parchment” and therefore fall within the 
realm of First Amendment protection.37  The analogy is that a 
videographer is to his recording as a writer is to his writings.38  Since 
the government cannot interfere with a writer chronicling his 
thoughts and beliefs, likewise the government cannot disrupt a 
videographer recording in public.39  Courts, however, have rejected 
this view, stating that because no idea is communicated through mere 
recordings, images and videos are not necessarily forms or means of 
 
disseminate the resulting recording) (emphasis in original); Robinson v. Fetterman, 
378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  Filming or videotaping is an essential part 
of reporting information and without the right to video-record, information 
gathering could not possibly be as effective as it is.  Id.  (“Videotaping is a legitimate 
means of gathering information for public dissemination . . . .”); Ramos v. Flowers, 
No. A-4910-10T3, 2012 WL 4208699, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2012) 
(“A documentary about a subject of public interest, such as urban gangs, is a form of 
investigative journalism, and the process of preparing such a documentary is a form 
of news gathering.  For that reason, those activities are protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”). 
 35  Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 597 (“‘[T]here is practically universal agreement that a 
major purpose of’ the First Amendment ‘was to protect the free discussion of 
government affairs’ . . . .”) (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennet, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 
(1976))); Ramos, 2012 WL 4208699, at *9 (“Gathering information about 
government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a 
cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting ‘free discussion of 
government affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).  Debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited even if they include unpleasant attacks and 
scrutiny on the government and public officials.  See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 74–75 (1964) (“For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; 
it is the essence of self-government. . . . [D]ebate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”). 
 36  See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 379. 
 37  Id. 
 38  See id. 
 39  Id. (“The government is barred from intermeddling . . . in both speech and 
thought . . . [which] undergird the constitutional commitments to personal 
autonomy and popular sovereignty.”). 
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expression that warrant protection.40  In determining whether an 
isolated expression was protectable as “symbolic speech,” courts have 
weighed the presence or absence of a “message conveyed” in the act 
that could constitute expression.41  Compared to the right to gather 
and disseminate information, the freedom of expression argument is 
somewhat weaker. 
Overall, although courts have failed to sufficiently discern a First 
Amendment right to film police officers in public, a solid argument 
exists for such a right.  The right to gather and disseminate 
information derived from the Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and 
the Petition Clause fairly applies to situations like Glik, where a 
concerned citizen publicly seeks to document the activity of law 
enforcement officers with his video camera.42  Thus, the right to film 
police officers in public has at least some identifiable roots in the 
plain language of the First Amendment. 
III.  INCENTIVES FOR POLICE OFFICERS TO INTIMIDATE VIDEOGRAPHERS 
Despite “sweeping” decisions like Glik that strongly protect 
videographers’ rights,43 police engage in arrests and intimidation 
tactics to suppress videographers from filming police conduct in 
public.44  This Part focuses on three aspects of the legal environment 
which compel some police officers to actively confront, intimidate, 
and even arrest individuals for filming police conduct in a public 
space: first, how police are often threatened by videographers; 
 
 40  Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(stating that to warrant protection, “there must still be (1) a message to be 
communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message regardless of the 
medium in which the message is sought to be expressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking, 
there is absolutely nothing to transmit from ‘mind to mind’”); see also Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); 
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).  But see Alvarez, 679 F,3d at 
596 (“[W]e have never seriously questioned that the process of writing words down 
on paper, painting a picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive 
activities entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). 
 41  See Montefusco, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 241–42; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 371. 
 42  See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 43  Erica Goode, New Tool for Police, the Video Camera, and New Legal Issues to Go With 
It, GOUPSTATE.COM (Oct. 11, 2011) http://www.goupstate.com/article/20111011 
/ZNYT02/110113009/1088/sports?p=4&tc=pg&tc=ar.  
 44  ReasonTV, The Government’s War on Cameras!, YOUTUBE (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LY0MUARqisM#! 
(interviewing Professor Eugene Volokh, who remarks “as it happens, the unfortunate 
reality is that often officers can intimidate people into not doing things they 
otherwise legally could”). 
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second, the advantages police wish to maintain in courtrooms; and, 
lastly, the confusing state of anti-wiretapping statutes and laws of 
general applicability which often falsely justify arrests.  Because of 
these three conditions, police officers will likely continue to suppress 
individuals who attempt to capture police conduct on video unless 
state legislatures enact changes that protect videographers’ First 
Amendment rights. 
Police are often uncomfortable and threatened by civilians with 
video cameras.45  The basic reality is that some police officers do not 
appreciate being videotaped, which results in aggressive reactions 
from police officers toward videographers.46  Generally, “[p]olice, like 
many civilians, are often camera-shy” and “dislike being recorded in 
embarrassing situations and may be concerned that dissemination of 
their images may put them at risk of retaliation.”47  Additionally, 
police officers often view videography as a challenge to their 
authority.48  Considering those challenges to authority and the fear of 
retaliation, the problem for police is how to respond when every 
citizen is a potential threat of surveillance and scrutiny.49  Police face 
potential bombardment from videographers because recording 
devices are cheaper and handier than ever.50  Due to the proliferation 
of inexpensive recording technology, police encounters in public are 
more commonly captured on portable media that can be 
disseminated almost instantly, allowing the public to constantly 
scrutinize and form opinions about the police.51 
 
 45  See, e.g., HellandKeller, supra note 3 (where the filmed police officer admitted, 
in apologizing to the videographers after they had a discussion with his superior, that 
he “was trying to intimidate” the videographers). 
 46  See id. 
 47  Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357. 
 48  See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_fig
ht_cellphone_recordings/?page=full (quoting David Ardia, Director of the Citizen 
Media Law Project at Harvard’s Berman Center for Internet and Society, “[p]olice 
are not used to ceding power, and [video cameras] are forcing them to cede 
power”). 
 49  Kevin Johnson, For Cops, Citizen Videos Bring Increased Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Oct. 
18, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-15-1Avideocops15_CV_N 
.htm (quoting San Jose Police Chief Rob Davis, “[t]here is no city not at risk of a 
video showing an officer doing something wrong . . . [t]he question, when one of 
these videos do surface, is what we do about it”). 
 50  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 617–18 (“Technological improvement means 
that recorded evidence of police-public encounters, good and bad, will be the norm, 
more frequent and more widely disseminated, within and without the news media.”). 
 51  See Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC 
NEWS, July 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-
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Police assert that this trend threatens certain societal interests.52  
Jim Pasco, the executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police,53 
remarked that the proliferation of cheap video equipment has “a 
chilling effect on some officers who are now afraid to act for fear of 
retribution by video.”54  Pasco’s statement implies that video causes 
police officers to second-guess themselves before they act.55  
Additionally, Pasco’s statement indicates that police officers either act 
differently or less deliberately when they know their conduct is not 
being recorded.  If a police officer knew that his conduct was lawful, 
justified, and otherwise correct, he probably would not hesitate from 
acting regardless of whether a videographer was digitally capturing 
his conduct.  A police officer’s hesitation while a videographer 
records his conduct reinforces the argument that filming police 
officers in public causes police officers to lawfully and thoughtfully 
conduct police business.  Pasco and the police seem to consider 
recorded observation of police conduct as a defect of society’s new 
power to digitally record in public, but perhaps it is actually a positive 
feature that reduces occurrences of police misconduct.56 
As the voice of the world’s largest organization of law 
enforcement officers,57 Pasco established that some police feel 
threatened by the concept that they are under surveillance.58  In an 
interview with Reason Magazine’s Radley Balko, Pasco supported the 
 
arrest/story?id=11179076#.TrW-BXKwXf8; Keith B. Richburg, New York’s Video 
Vigilante, Scourge of Parking Enforcers, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/02 
/AR2008080201503.html (describing the increasing trend of amateur videos of 
police conduct on YouTube). 
 52  Johnson, supra note 49 (reporting that some police organizations believe 
“videotaping officers poses broad risks that reach beyond Internet embarrassments: 
It could cause officers to hesitate in life-threatening situations”). 
 53  FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, http://www.fop.net (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) 
(“The Fraternal Order of Police is the world’s largest organization of sworn law 
enforcement officers, with more than 325,000 members in more than 2,100 lodges.  
We are the voice of those who dedicate their lives to protecting and serving our 
communities. . . . [N]o one knows police officers better than the FOP.”). 
 54  Johnson, supra note 49. 
 55  See id. 
 56  Radley Balko, Police Officers Don’t Check Their Civil Rights at the Station House 
Door, REASON (Aug. 9, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/08/09/police-
officers-dont-check-the (referencing how the Washington Post, USA Today, the 
Washington Examiner, the Washington Times, and other commentators have “all 
weighed in on the side that citizen photography and videography can be an 
important check to keep police officers accountable and transparent”).  
 57  FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, supra note 53. 
 58  See Johnson, supra note 49. 
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arrests of individuals like Anthony Graber,59 who faced over fifteen 
years in prison for filming his own traffic stop, because the video 
could be manipulated to negatively portray police officers.60  Pasco 
elaborated that civilian video could be edited or taken out of context, 
and when the video is not in the custody or control of law 
enforcement, it is rightly inadmissible as evidence.61  Further, Pasco 
asserted that “[l]etting people record police officers is an extreme 
and intrusive response to a problem that’s so rare it might as well not 
exist.  It would be like saying we should do away with DNA evidence 
because there’s a one in a billion chance that it could be wrong.”62  
The “problem” that Pasco is referring to is police misconduct that is 
uncovered by civilian videography.63  Overall, if Pasco truly represents 
the largest law enforcement organization in the world, then his 
statements suggest that the law-enforcement community views the act 
of filming a police officer as “extreme and intrusive.”64  This anxiety 
explains why police officers may act particularly aggressively toward 
videographers. 
One reason why video threatens police officers is that civilian 
recordings have revealed serious inconvenient truths and exposed 
horrible incidents of police misconduct—most notably, the Rodney 
King incident.65  Arguably, prohibitions on video recording and 
 
 59  Balko, supra note 56; see State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. 
LEXIS 7, at *4–5 (Md. Cir. Sept. 27, 2010).  Maryland state police officers raided 
Anthony Graber’s home, confiscated his camera, computers, and hard drive, and 
arrested him for violating state wiretap laws when he posted the video of himself 
being pulled over by a gun-wielding undercover police officer on YouTube.  Sanchez, 
supra note 51.  Maryland Circuit Court Judge Emory A. Pitt, Jr. dismissed the case 
reasoning that law enforcement officers enjoy a very narrow expectation of privacy in 
the performance of their duties.  Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *7–8; see also 
Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to Record Police Traffic Stop, BALT. SUN, 
Sept. 27, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-09-27/news/bs-md-recorded-
traffic-stop-20100927_1_police-officers-plitt-cell-phones; Anthony Graber, Cop Pulls 
Out Gun On Motorcyclist, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK5bMSyJCsg.  
 60  Balko, supra note 56. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  See id. 
 64  Id.  Pasco is not referring to conduct surrounding recording of police officers, 
just the act of recording alone.  Id. (Pasco remarks “[y]ou have 960,000 police 
officers in this country, and millions of contacts between those officers and citizens.  
I’ll bet you can’t name 10 incidents [sic] where a citizen video has shown a police 
officer to have lied on a police report. . . . Letting people record police officers is an 
extreme and intrusive response to a problem that’s so rare it might as well not 
exist.”). 
 65  See Jim Kavanagh, Rodney King, 20 Years Later, CNN (Mar. 3, 2011), 
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image capture “are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.”66  The 
police’s desire to censor videographers suggests that police officers 
are interested in controlling public perception of their conduct, and 
not just interferences with police business.  Because police record 
their own conduct at nearly all times they are on duty, justifications 
for censoring videographers from recording the exact same conduct 
seem unreasonable.67  Police previously enjoyed a monopoly over the 
ability to record public confrontations using cameras in cruisers and 
recording equipment attached to officers.68  The power to record, 
however, is no longer unilaterally in police possession because private 
citizens can cheaply record police actions with minimal effort.69  The 
potential First Amendment rights in filming police, the broad 
availability of recording devices, and the cultural obsession with 
posting personal videos on the internet eliminate any shroud of 
secrecy that police could maintain in publicly discharging their 
duties.70  This threatening environment encourages police officers to 
either act appropriately at all times because they are under 
surveillance, or intimidate videographers to reduce any incentives to 
film police conduct.71  Thus, some police officers seek to deter the 
public from filming their conduct because that conduct may be 
illegal, while others, like Pasco, find the act of recording police to be 
inherently intrusive.72  It is for these reasons that police officers are 
incentivized to confront, intimidate, and arrest videographers. 
When the biggest threats to police credibility were merely 
 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-03/us/rodney.king.20.years.later_1_laurence-
powell-theodore-briseno-king-attorney-milton-grimes?_s=PM:US; see also 
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting) (commenting on the importance of George Holliday’s infamous  
recording of the Rodney King incident). 
 66  Kreimer, supra note 14, at 383. 
 67  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651 (“[T]he basic act of recording officers in the 
performance of their official duties does not burden the officers or interfere with 
their ability to execute their offices.”); Goode, supra note 43. 
 68  INT’L. ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN 
POLICING 13–26 (2004), available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/publications/video 
_evidence.pdf (“Attorneys representing [police] agencies categorically support the 
use of the in-car camera.  They pointed out that video evidence allows them to save 
time in case disposition.  On rare occasions, after reviewing the video evidence, they 
decided to settle the case in lieu of proceeding to trial. . . . The presence of video 
evidence allow[s] the agency to defend the officer with great success.”). 
 69  See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“[T]he proliferation of cellphone and other 
technology has equipped people to record actions in public.”). 
 70  Id. 
 71  See Balko, supra note 56. 
 72  Id. 
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eyewitness accounts of an incident, police could at least attempt to 
plausibly deny embarrassing or illegal conduct.73  Once the availability 
of portable recordable media exploded, however, police officers lost 
the advantages of plausibility, deniability, and controlled 
documentation of the incident.74  In “he said, she said” factual 
disputes, police officers are usually given the benefit of the doubt 
during proceedings.75  In forming the record, police are accustomed 
to receiving substantial deference, and many prefer to be in a 
position where they can shape the perception of their actions without 
competing against a digital record.76  In cases of police misconduct, 
the facts are often reduced to a citizen’s word against the police 
officer’s word.77  Juries are more inclined to believe police officers 
over ordinary citizens.78  Therefore, prior to the proliferation of 
recording devices, police officers maintained a strategic advantage in 
creating the record. 
As portable videography spreads, police lose this strategic 
courtroom advantage.  For instance, after the Prince George’s County 
riot police beat Jack McKenna, police officers provided sworn 
statements that McKenna “struck [the] officers and their horses, 
causing minor injuries.”79  These sworn statements were directly 
contradicted by amateur video footage of the incident, which 
indisputably demonstrated that McKenna never touched the police 
 
 73  See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 68, at 5–6 (discussing the 
history of video recording in police cruisers, effectively beginning in the 1980s). 
 74  See Rowinski, supra note 48. 
 75  See Sanchez, supra note 51 (quoting James Green, an attorney for the ACLU of 
Florida, who remarked that “[j]udges and juries want to believe law 
enforcement[;] . . . they want to believe police officers and unless you have credible 
evidence to contradict police officers, it’s often very difficult to believe the word of a 
citizen over a police officer.”  The ACLU filed a First Amendment lawsuit on behalf 
of Sharron Tasha Ford after she was arrested for videotaping an encounter between 
police and her teenage son at a movie theater).  
 76  Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357. 
 77  See, e.g., Youa Vang Lee v. Anderson, Civ. No. 07-1205, 2009 WL 1287832, at *9 
(D. Minn. May 6, 2009) (concluding, despite heavily disputed facts, that both the 
police officer who shot the plaintiff’s son and the city were entitled to summary 
judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of a policy or custom 
as the cause of the police officer’s alleged misconduct). 
 78  See Skehill, supra note 14, at 998; Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: 
Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 
764–65 (1993); Wasserman, supra note 14, at 618. 
 79  Bradley Blackburn, University of Maryland Student Brutally Beaten By Police After 
Basketball Game, ABC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/video-
shows-university-maryland-student-beaten-county-
police/story?id=10362033#.TrYI7HKwXf8. 
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officers or their horses, and was instead calmly retreating when 
multiple riot police battered him against a wall and beat him with 
batons as he lay on the ground.80  Ultimately, the state dropped all 
charges against McKenna, and the Prince George’s County Police 
Chief, Roberto Hylton, suspended one police officer.81 
As the McKenna case illustrates, police officers can lose their 
credibility very quickly if outside recordings are brought to the 
attention of the public and the court.  Video evidence is so effective 
because the images provide a “direct, unmediated view of the reality 
they depict,” and viewers, such as jury members, are more likely to 
accept those images as “credible representations” of how events 
actually transpired.82  Compared to verbal descriptions of events, 
images are often more powerful for the viewer because the character 
of the medium is self-authenticating.83  When officers are caught 
“blatantly contradict[ing]” video evidence, the result is fierce public 
criticism and sometimes suspension, firing, embarrassment, and/or 
civil damages.84  Thus, expanding the availability of video reduces the 
likelihood that a police officer can successfully make a false 
statement. 
Additionally, video evidence is particularly important in 
resolving civil rights claims that follow allegations of police 
misconduct.  For example, video evidence can drastically change the 
outcomes of § 1983 civil rights actions85 because courts understand 
video evidence as “singularly powerful” and “an unambiguous source 
 
 80  Id.; Roberts and Wood Law, Beating and Arrest of Jack McKenna - April 3, 2011, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zcrnnmt8cg8.  
 81  Blackburn, supra note 79. 
 82  See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 619 (quoting RICHARD K. SHERWIN, POPULAR 
CULTURE AND LAW xiv (Richard K. Sherwin ed., 2006)). 
 83  ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A]udio and 
audiovisual recording are uniquely reliable and powerful methods of preserving and 
disseminating news and information about events that occur in public.  Their self-
authenticating character makes it highly unlikely that other methods could be 
considered reasonably adequate substitutes.”); Kreimer, supra note 14, at 386. 
 84  See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651–52 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted); see also Trymaine Lee, Police Officer Who Shoved a Bicyclist Is Off the Job, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A24.  But see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983) 
(establishing that police officers who commit perjury have an absolute immunity 
against suits for money damages because allowing officers to be sued for their 
testimony as witnesses “might undermine not only their contribution to the judicial 
process but also the effective performance of their other public duties”). 
 85  See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (discussing how the 
“existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question” is an “added 
wrinkle” to the resolution of the case). 
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of proof.”86  Fundamentally, video is perceived as truthful, objective, 
and generally clear, which often gives the video evidence dispositive 
weight in determining the outcome of the civil rights claim.87  
Because videography has this power, police are tempted to preserve 
their advantage in recording by preventing outside videographers 
from ever capturing police conduct in the first place.88  Since a 
videographer may capture police misconduct that the officer cannot 
plausibly deny, police have to choose between acting appropriately 
and preventing the creation of evidence of misconduct.  
Consequently, some police officers have chosen the latter option, 
which can result in intimidation, harassment, and sometimes the 
arrest of otherwise law-abiding videographers.89 
When police officers arrest videographers, the videographers 
often demand justification for their arrest.90  Police officers 
commonly cite either the local jurisdiction’s anti-wiretapping statute91 
 
 86  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607; see also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607; Marvin v. 
City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2007); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 
1260, 1262 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 87  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607. 
 88  See Rowinski, supra note 48. 
 89  See sources cited supra note 3. 
 90  See supra note 3. 
 91  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1975); ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 42.20.310 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-60-120 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-
304 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 1335 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
62 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1111 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
6702 (West 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (West 2006); IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1 
(2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (West 2008); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (West 2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 710 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 
(West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 750.539 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 542.402 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
200.650 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:156A-3 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 15A-287 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West 2008); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 29533.52 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.3 (West 
2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 
2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-35-21 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-29-20 (2003); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2011); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402 (West 2004); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2010); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-3 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 2007).  States 
missing from this list are Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming.  
Vermont does not have an anti-wiretapping statute in effect.  For a discussion on the 
problems with state wiretap laws, see Marianne F. Kies, Policing the Police: Freedom of the 
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or general laws, such as obstruction of justice or failure to obey a 
police order.92  Because of the confusing state of these laws, especially 
the anti-wiretapping statutes, citizens are often unaware of precisely 
how the law applies to their conduct, thereby allowing police officers 
to use this ignorance to intimidate videographers.93  Although police 
may argue otherwise, no law directly prohibits a videographer from 
filming or photographing things in public.94  Nevertheless, some 
police still attempt to combat the spread of public surveillance of 
police conduct through other existing statutes and “creative 
prosecutorial discretion.”95 
Police often rely on anti-wiretapping statutes96 to arrest civilians 
who insist on recording police officers without their consent.97  In 
most states and under federal jurisdiction, the anti-wiretapping 
statutes only require one party to consent for legal recording or 
eavesdropping of a communication.98  In these “one-party-consent” 
jurisdictions, if one person involved in the communication consents 
to the recording—including the person recording the 
 
Press, the Right to Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
274 (2011).  For a discussion on whether state wiretap laws violate the First 
Amendment, see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87, 595–608 (7th Cir. 
2012) (concluding that the Illinois eavesdropping statute “restricts a medium of 
expression commonly used for the preservation and communication of information 
and ideas, thus triggering [heightened] First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 92  Stossel, The War On Cameras, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Eu0E1znMZM&feature=related (interviewing 
Radley Balko, Senior Editor of Reason Magazine). 
 93  See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6 (Md. Cir. 
Sept. 27, 2010) (where Judge Pitt remarked that Maryland’s anti-wiretap statute “on 
its face is unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violative of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution”); The Government’s War on Cameras!, 
supra note 44 (interviewing Professor Eugene Volokh, who adds that “not everybody 
knows what the law is, and sometimes not even all the police officers know what the 
law is”). 
 94  See The Government’s War on Cameras!, supra note 44 (quoting Professor Eugene 
Volokh: “[I]n the jurisdictions of which I am aware, there is no prohibition on video-
recording or photographing things when you are standing in a public place and 
you’re looking at another public place”). 
 95  See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357. 
 96  For examples of such statutes, see supra note 91. 
 97  See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 378. 
 98  See supra note 91.  Only twelve jurisdictions in the United States have “all-party 
consent” requirements in their wiretap statute.  These jurisdictions are: California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  See The Government’s War on 
Cameras!, supra note 44; see also Stossel, supra note 92. 
MURPHY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:33 PM 
2013] COMMENT 335 
 
communication—the conduct is legal.99  Assuming the videographer 
is consenting to his own action, police cannot reasonably expect to 
prosecute or arrest a videographer in “one-party-consent” 
jurisdictions for anti-wiretapping reasons.  Massachusetts and eleven 
other jurisdictions (hereinafter, the “all-party-consent” jurisdictions), 
however, criminalize recording unless every party in the 
communication consents to the recording.100 
Among “all-party-consent” jurisdictions, the issue of whether or 
not police officers are protected by anti-wiretapping laws is hotly 
debated.101  Some jurisdictions require that parties have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in their communication in order to receive 
protection from anti-wiretapping statutes.102  A strong argument that 
is used in these jurisdictions is that police officers do not have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” when conducting police business 
in public.103  Police officers ought not to expect privacy in public 
communication because of the public interest in police oversight, 
along with the fact that police communications in the line of public 
duty are generally less intimate than communications in other 
contexts.104  In addressing this issue, some courts have found that 
police cannot enjoy a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the 
 
 99  See Indiana Recording Law, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/indiana/indiana-recording-law (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2012) (explaining that “you may record a telephone conversation if you are 
a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the 
conversation”).  The purpose of the anti-wiretapping statutes in “one-party-consent” 
jurisdictions is to prevent a third party from recording a private conversation 
between two individuals without their consent.  See id. 
 100  See sources cited supra note 91. 
 101  Compare Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 2001) (rejecting 
the argument that police are exempt from anti-wiretapping laws because they lack 
reasonable expectations of privacy in public communications), with Hornberger v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (discussing 
how the New Jersey statute allows for members of the public to secretly record 
conversations when the speakers have no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 102  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006); Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595. 
 103  See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (where the defendant validly, but unsuccessfully, 
argued that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
words during a traffic stop). 
 104  See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing 
how the privacy interests protected by the Illinois anti-wiretapping statute are “not at 
issue” because “[t]he ACLU want[ed] to openly audio record police officers 
performing their duties in public places and speaking at a volume audible to 
bystanders.  Communications of this sort lack any ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”); Dina Mishra, Undermining Excessive Privacy 
For Police: Citizen Tape Recording To Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555 
(2008). 
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public discharge of their duties, while other courts have found that 
an expectation of privacy is not necessary for a violation of an anti-
wiretapping statute to occur.105  In jurisdictions which require a 
reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy, most courts have 
found that police officers are public officials, and as such, are not 
afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public discharge 
of their duties.106 
Another element of confusion is the differentiation between 
video and audio recording.107  Many jurisdictions that do not require 
“all-party-consent” may still require that all parties to the 
communication be put on notice that the conversation is being 
recorded.108  A party may provide notice by showing a video camera in 
plain sight.109  Furthermore, for conduct to be covered by an anti-
wiretapping statute, it may also need to be an “oral communication,” 
which may exclude video from the scope of the anti-wiretapping 
statute.110  In Glik, the police officer, assuming Massachusetts’s anti-
wiretapping statute only applied to audio, asked Glik if his cellular 
phone recorded audio.111  It was only after Glik answered in the 
affirmative that police officers arrested him under the color of the 
anti-wiretapping statute.112  In resolving Glik, the First Circuit failed to 
differentiate between the audio and video aspects of Glik’s 
 
 105  See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (upholding Michael Hyde’s conviction because the 
legislature expressly established a ban on surreptitious recording to protect privacy, 
even for police officers).  But see State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. 
LEXIS 7, at *35 (Md. Cir. Sept. 27, 2010) (“Those of us who are public officials and 
are entrusted with the power of the state . . . should not expect our actions to be 
shielded from public observation.  ‘Seq duis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ (Who watches 
the watchmen?)”). 
 106  See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606–07; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 258 
(3d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2004); O’Brien v. 
DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976); Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *17; 
Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595; Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523–24 (Pa. 1998); State 
v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).  Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (establishing that individuals do not have a reasonable 
expectations of privacy in what they “knowingly expose[] to the public”). 
 107  See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing how the police 
officer only arrested Glik for illegal recording after he acknowledged that his cellular 
phone recorded audio). 
 108  See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62, 63–64 
(Or. Ct. App. 2011). 
 109  Glik, 655 F.3d at 87. 
 110  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000). 
 111  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
 112  Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
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recording.113  Instead, the court simply declared that Glik had a  “well 
established” right to film police officers in public without indicating 
precisely which aspect of Glik’s conduct was protected First 
Amendment activity.114 
Overall, anti-wiretapping statutes are valuable tools for police 
officers seeking to suppress videographers.  Since the laws lack clarity 
and well-defined scope, police can creatively and effectively cite anti-
wiretapping statutes to intimidate even savvy videographers.  Yet, if 
police do not assert charges from these anti-wiretapping statutes, they 
still have laws of general applicability at their disposal.115 
Laws of general applicability include charges like obstruction of 
justice, disobeying an officer, obstructing an investigation, interfering 
with an officer, failure to obey an officer, disorderly conduct, resisting 
arrest, obstructing a street, and harassment.116  While many of these 
charges may be dismissed, videographers are still arrested, placed 
into squad cars, and carted away from the scene.117  Videographers 
may be fully within their rights to videotape the police, but after one 
confrontation they may expect intimidation, harassment, or arrest 
because in most cases “nothing” happens to the police officers who 
make false arrests.118  Police are increasingly using laws of general 
applicability to suppress videographers from filming police conduct 
because citizens often do not know or understand the laws, thereby 
allowing police to think they can get away with applying the 
charges.119  Overall, the inconvenience and embarrassment of being 
arrested creates a chilling effect for videographers, which makes laws 
of general applicability another valuable tool for police officers 
seeking to suppress videographers from filming police conduct.120 
 
 113  Id.  
 114  Id. at 85. 
 115  See Stossel, supra note 92; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 361 (“Where wiretap 
prohibitions do not apply, officers faced with defiant videographers frequently turn 
to broader criminal statutes that provide substantial enforcement discretion.”). 
 116  Stossel, supra note 92. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. (quoting Radley Balko from the interview). 
 119  Kreimer, supra note 14, at 394 (“[O]ne growing source of litigation is the 
tendency of police officers to arrest photographers on trumped-up charges both as a 
way of preventing the spread of inconvenient truths and as a response to free-floating 
anxiety about individuals who remind officials of terrorists.”); The Government’s War 
on Cameras!, supra note 44. 
 120  See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 648–49 (“Government might stop people 
from recording public encounters . . . through enactment and enforcement of 
express prohibitions on secret or unconsented-to recordings of persons and 
conversations . . . [or] through officers’ efforts to move filmers away from the scene, 
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IV.  SAFEGUARDS TO POLICE MISCONDUCT ARE INEFFECTIVELY 
PROTECTING VIDEOGRAPHERS 
When Radley Balko said that “nothing” happens to police 
officers who unlawfully intimidate videographers, he did not 
comprehensively describe how police officers have to answer for their 
actions.121  Balko did not literally mean that nothing happens 
following an incident between police and videographers.122  Rather, 
he meant that police officers do not face serious consequences for 
their actions.123  This Part discusses how the present framework of 
safeguards designed to deter police officers from harassing citizens 
fails to adequately protect videographers who are unlawfully 
intimidated by police.  Specifically, this Part will cover the failure of 
three safeguards: first, the external check provided by the public at 
large; second, self-policing mechanisms such as internal affairs; and 
third, the civil remedy available to citizens who believe a public 
official has violated their constitutional rights.  This Part will 
demonstrate how each of these deterrents is ineffective at curbing 
potential police misconduct toward videographers. 
A.  Safeguard #1: Public Oversight and How Police Can Defeat Its 
Purpose by Eliminating Public Recording of Their Conduct 
Some scholars argue that allowing citizens to freely videotape 
police in public incentivizes police officers to properly fulfill their 
duties.124  Leaders at some police departments have adopted this view 
as well.125  For instance, Lieutenant Robin Larson of the Broward 
County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office, takes the position that “[a]ll of our 
people should be conducting themselves like they are being recorded 
all the time.”126  With the persistent threat of surveillance, rational 
police officers would want to avoid committing any misconduct in 
public because video documentation of that misconduct could be 
widely disseminated very rapidly.127  In that event, the general public, 
 
to confiscate equipment, and, perhaps, to arrest filmers for violating non-speech laws 
of general applicability.”). 
 121  See Stossel, supra note 92. 
 122  See id. 
 123  See id. 
 124  Mishra, supra note 104, at 1553. 
 125  Johnson, supra note 49 (quoting Lieutenant Robin Larson of the Broward 
County, Florida Sheriff’s Office). 
 126  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127  See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“[W]ith the advent of media-sharing websites like 
Facebook and YouTube, the practice of openly recording policy activity has become 
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aware of the misconduct, could utilize the political process to 
pressure law enforcement officers to respect the limits of their 
authority.128  Thus, mindful of potential public scrutiny and scorn, 
police officers would generally avoid performing illegal activities to 
protect themselves.129 
The existence of some press coverage and public scrutiny of 
police misconduct indicates that this deterrent is somewhat effective, 
but the evidence of police-videographer confrontations in the news 
and on the Internet suggests that police are undermining the 
effectiveness of video by attempting to eliminate it.130  By intimidating 
and arresting videographers, police are creating more footage of 
police-videographer confrontations, but may also be preventing 
footage of more alarming misconduct, such as the beatings of Jack 
McKenna or Rodney King, from being created in the first place.131  An 
example is the case of Emily Good, a Rochester woman whose video-
confrontation with police garnered national attention.132  Rochester 
police officers arrested Good for obstructing governmental 
administration when she filmed a traffic stop directly outside her 
home.133  Good was somewhat of a social activist, and filmed the traffic 
stop because she believed it involved racial profiling.134  Police 
commanded Good to stop recording the incident, but when she 
 
commonplace.”). 
 128  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 645 (“Public attention and outrage produces 
government action . . . . [A]ttention and outrage are more likely when video has 
gone “viral” and is being devoured and dissected on YouTube, blogs, and the 
mainstream news media, and where visceral public reaction to the video reflects a 
wide popular interpretation of the video as showing governmental misconduct.  A 
viral video puts government on its heels, forcing it to publicly defend its officers (at 
least initially), while also recognizing that, because of the video, the people have 
developed informed perceptions and conclusions about the incident—perceptions 
that officials must respect (or at least consider) in making administrative 
decisions.”). 
 129  See id. 
 130  See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“There are no hard statistics for video recording 
arrests.  But the experiences of Surmacz and Glik highlight what civil libertarians call 
a troubling misuse of the state’s wiretapping law to stifle the kind of street-level 
oversight that cellphone and video technology make possible.”). 
 131  Cf. Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME, Aug. 4, 
2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html; 
Blackburn, supra note 79. 
 132  Ray Levato, Emily Good to Sue Rochester Police Department, WHEC ROCHESTER 
(June 28, 2011), http://www.whec.com/news/stories/s2176499.shtml. 
 133  Id.  
 134  Id. (the traffic stop in front of Good’s home involved three white police 
officers arresting a lone black man and searching his car). 
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continued one of the officers arrested her.135  Although a highly 
publicized discussion about Good’s rights sprouted from the 
incident, police successfully frustrated Good’s original purpose for 
filming—to monitor racial profiling by police officers.136  By arresting 
Good, the Rochester police officers succeeded in preventing her 
from documenting anything related to racial profiling.137 
The Good case highlights why the public-oversight deterrent 
fails to protect videographers from harassment and intimidation.138  
Instead of incentivizing officers to conduct their police business 
properly, the presence of a video camera may actually encourage a 
police officer to prevent the creation of footage of his conduct.139  To 
do so, the police officer may harass, intimidate, and arrest the 
videographer, thereby shielding himself from liability for other 
potentially serious acts of misconduct.140  While some videographers 
may be defiant and willing to resist police pressures, many individuals 
may simply seek to avoid confrontation and move on with their 
lives.141  The ultimate result is a chilling effect on the filming of police 
in public. 
Concededly, if the footage of the police officer attacking the 
videographer is as offensive as the Rodney King beating, the public 
would probably demand accountability in a similar manner.142  Still, 
this deterrent may only be effective when videographers are 
successful in capturing police misconduct that warrants unified 
public outcry.  Police harassment of videographers certainly warrants 
public scrutiny, but because the act of intimidating a videographer is 
not nearly as offensive as police beatings, shootings, or corruption 
 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. 
 138  See Levato, supra note 132. 
 139  See id.; see also Rowinski, supra note 48 (quoting Sarah Wunsch of the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, stating that “[t]he police apparently do not 
want witnesses to what they do in public”). 
 140  See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“Ever since the police beating of Rodney King in 
Los Angeles in 1991 was videotaped. . . . the arrests of street videographers, whether 
they use cellphones or other video technology, offers a dramatic illustration of the 
collision between new technology and policing practices.”). 
 141  ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2012) (where the ACLU 
did not follow through on its planned audiovisual recording of police in public 
“because of a credible fear of prosecution”); Cohen, supra note 131 (“Most people 
are not so game for a fight with the police.  They just stop filming.  These are the 
cases no one finds out about, in which there is no arrest or prosecution, but the 
public’s freedoms have nevertheless been eroded.”). 
 142  See id. 
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scandals, it is not as likely to stir an equally strong public reaction.143  
Ideally, the issues surrounding police confrontations with 
videographers ought to be resolved before more incidents similar to 
Rodney King’s occur. 
Another solution is needed because public awareness is not 
enough to prevent police officers from intimidating and arresting 
videographers.  By aggressively engaging videographers, police 
effectively deter videographers from monitoring police conduct, 
which simultaneously shields other types of misconduct from 
exposure.144  Since the public is not as offended as it would be if other 
types of misconduct were captured on camera, society is not as 
motivated to remedy the situation. 
B.  Safeguard #2: Internal Affairs: Why Law Enforcement Self-Policing 
is Insufficient 
Law enforcement leadership is in a position to self-correct police 
misconduct through internal investigations and disciplining police 
officers.145  In the past, police leadership has sternly held violating 
officers accountable for their actions.146  Also, some police 
departments claim that the increase in public video-recording of 
police conduct has positively affected change in department training 
and staffing.147  Broadly speaking, internal affairs departments have 
sometimes been effective in combating forms of police misconduct.148 
While police departments should be able to self-regulate, this 
established deterrent has several limitations.  Most notably, in the 
context of police officers harassing and intimidating videographers, it 
is unlikely that any substantial consequences will result from a 
videographer complaining to the police department.149  For instance, 
 
 143  See id. 
 144  See Levato, supra note 132; see also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 145  See Cohen, supra note 131. 
 146  See id. (discussing the New York City police officer who was laid off after 
amateur video footage revealed he lied in his sworn statement about how he shoved a 
bicyclist to the ground); Johnson, supra note 49 (discussing the case of Jack McKenna 
and the ensuing suspensions of three officers involved in the beating of the 
University of Maryland student). 
 147  See Cohen, supra note 131 (Broward County Sheriff’s Officer Larson discusses 
how recorded incidents have “sparked” activity from the department to better train 
its officers). 
 148  See Skehill, supra note 14, at 996 (“[M]any police departments have 
implemented internal affairs departments and citizen investigatory commissions to 
investigate and discipline police misconduct.”). 
 149  See Stossel, supra note 92 (Radley Balko commenting how “nothing” happens 
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in Emily Good’s case, Rochester Chief of Police James M. Sheppard 
conducted an investigation that resulted in no announced 
disciplinary action, and the Chief merely mandated additional 
training and awareness for officers on the force.150  Because the 
internal investigations are not transparent, the public cannot actually 
know if the investigations effectively resolve the problem.151 
Another problem with the internal affairs model for reporting 
police misconduct is that in the context of video records, citizens may 
be afraid to report.152  In Massachusetts, Michael Hyde was arrested 
for violating wiretapping statutes while trying to report police 
abuse.153  Six days after Hyde recorded an incident with police, he 
filed a formal complaint at the Abington police station.154  After the 
Abington police department performed an internal investigation, 
which absolved five of its officers, it sought a criminal complaint 
against Hyde for the recording he used to complain about the 
officers.155  Since Hyde’s conviction was upheld, videographers can be 
fearful, especially in all-party-consent states,156 that reporting incidents 
to the local police station could result in their own arrest. 
Another example that demonstrates the failings of internal 
 
to police officers who falsely arrest videographers for filming their conduct). 
 150  See Press Release, Rochester Police Dep’t., Chief Sheppard Announces 
Outcome of Internal Administrative Reviews on Emily Good Arrest, Traffic 
Enforcement Operation (Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.rochestercitynewspaper.com/uploads/articles/12343-9.2.11-Press-
Conference-Media-Packet.pdf.  In a letter attached to the report, Sheppard stated 
that although police officers deal with high amounts of stress and danger, they must 
act professionally and with “appropriate respect for the rights of those involved.”  Id.  
Sheppard discussed how videographers generally have First Amendment rights to 
film police officers in public spaces, and that police officers “should assume that 
someone is watching and recording [their] actions at all times.”  Id.  But police 
officers are to use “good judgment” to determine when those individuals recording 
them cross the line into obstructing justice.  Id. 
 151  See generally THE CITY OF N.Y. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE 
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, ANATOMY 
OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS (1994), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQ
FjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.parc.info%2Fclient_files%2FSpecial%2520Reports
%2F4%2520-%2520Mollen%2520Commission%2520-
%2520NYPD.pdf&ei=ZiVpULmHH6nC0QH1p4HwAw&usg=AFQjCNF9N3sXOxbKQ
oBJVLzpZk5jrB833w&sig2=dJjggMgRkD9GBQ9I9P9fKQ&cad=rja. 
 152  See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Mass. 2001). 
 153  Id.  
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  See supra Part II. 
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investigations is the case of Anthony Graber in Maryland.157  Maryland 
State Police raided Graber’s home and seized his camera and 
computer equipment after he posted a YouTube video of a plain-
clothed police officer stopping Graber on a highway.158  Graber was 
facing more than fifteen years in prison if he was convicted of 
violating Maryland’s anti-wiretapping statute.159  Fortunately for 
Graber, Circuit Judge Emory Pitt threw out the four-count indictment 
against Graber.160  Although Graber was ultimately vindicated, the 
prospect of spending over fifteen years in prison for what may have 
been First Amendment protected activity is quite disturbing.161  If a 
different Judge presided over his case, it is very possible that Graber 
would be sitting in prison until approximately 2026.162  Although 
Graber was not reporting police misconduct to the police, the effort 
by police to arrest Graber long after the traffic stop indicates that if 
Graber had tried to report police conduct like Hyde did, he may have 
been arrested in the same manner.163  Any videographer with footage 
of police misconduct might be hesitant to bring such footage to the 
attention of police if it may jeopardize his freedom. 
Overall, law enforcement self-policing is unreliable in 
safeguarding against police aggression toward videographers.  Police 
officers are typically not harshly punished for violating the rights of 
videographers and the reporting mechanism for concerned citizens 
poses too great of a risk of arrest.164  If a citizen wishes to complain to 
the police about an officer’s conduct, he may hesitate to bring his 
video evidence of the alleged misconduct.  With no reason to take 
internal investigations seriously and the substantial risks involved in 
bringing video evidence to the police’s attention, it is unlikely that 
 
 157  See generally State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 (Md. 
Cir. Sept. 27, 2010).  
 158  See Sanchez, supra note 51. 
 159  See generally supra note 59. 
 160  Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6, 34–35 (remarking that Graber’s 
arguments are correct—that Maryland’s wiretap statute “on its face is 
unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violative of the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.”). 
 161  Id.  The fact that Graber’s violation was punishable up to fifteen years in 
prison is disturbing because Graber would be subject to the same sentence if he 
committed robbery, and a shorter sentence if he committed sexual assault in the 
third degree.  MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 3-307, 402 (West 2006). 
 162  See id. 
 163  Compare Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Mass. 2001), with 
Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *3–4. 
 164  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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internal affairs can properly deter police officers from violating 
videographers’ rights to film police in public. 
C.  Safeguard #3: The Shortcomings of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil 
Remedies 
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,165 Congress enacted 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to provide civil remedies for citizens whose rights have 
been abused “under the color” of state law.166  The statute allows a 
private citizen to sue for damages and prospective relief against 
municipalities and local governments167 when officials violate his or 
her civil rights.168  Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive 
rights; rather, it is merely a remedy or method for citizens to 
vindicate their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.169  In 
defining the remedy, the Supreme Court has noted that § 1983 is 
intended to financially compensate victims of official misconduct.170 
When a lawsuit is filed against a police officer in his official 
capacity, the suit is known as an “official-capacity suit” and is treated 
as a suit against the government itself.171  To prevail in a § 1983 
official-capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that “the entity’s policy or 
custom played a part in the violation of federal law.”172  Thus, for the 
government to be liable, the Supreme Court requires that the agent 
directly harm the plaintiff on behalf of the government and that the 
“moving force” behind the agent’s action be a government 
implemented policy, statement, regulation, or custom.173  Besides a 
 
 165  Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988 (2006)).  The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is also 
known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act.”  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). 
 166  42 U.S.C. § 1983; Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983: An Overview of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent, THE 
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 167  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 668 (1978). 
 168  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179–80 (1961). 
 169  Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144–45 & n.3 (1979). 
 170  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978).  Notably, the Court has held 
that punitive damages may not be awarded against a municipality.  City of Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1981).  Fortunately for plaintiffs, the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 allows a citizen to receive attorney’s fees if 
he prevails, meaning receives more than nominal damages.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); 
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). 
 171  Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 
(1985). 
 172  Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 
 173  Monell, 436 U.S at 690–94. 
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direct policy endorsing unlawful conduct, a failure to properly train 
agents and employees can be a “moving force” behind the agent’s 
wrongful conduct.174  The failure to train must amount to “deliberate 
indifference,” however, meaning that the government entity made a 
deliberate choice to not train police officers with respect to the 
violated right in question.175  But, § 1983 plaintiffs will not succeed in 
showing “deliberate indifference” where a police officer’s conduct is 
“obvious to all without training or supervision.”176 
Scholars doubt whether § 1983 is an effective remedy.177  Absent 
a discoverable pattern of violations, in order to claim that the 
government was “deliberately indifferent,” the plaintiff would have to 
show that the failure to train officers made violations of federal rights 
“highly predictable.”178  This requirement is farcical because the 
existence of a pattern does not change the fact that an individual’s 
rights have been violated in one specific instance.  A pattern, by 
definition, requires multiple occurrences of linkable events, but the 
plaintiff in any given § 1983 suit should not need to worry about 
anyone else’s violated rights.  Whether others have had their rights 
similarly violated is irrelevant with regard to compensating an 
individual for his injuries.  Attempting to prove that a failure to train 
made the commission of violations “highly predictable” further 
deteriorates protection of individual constitutional rights.179  
Similarly, to determine if a violation is “highly predictable,” the court 
 
 174  City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989). 
 175  Id.; Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489–90 (11th Cir. 1997).  
Since the Supreme Court rejected respondeat superior liability for municipalities, 
the aggrieved plaintiff must prove that the municipality somehow trained or was 
“deliberately indifferent” toward training police officers.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
 176  Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490 (quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299–
300 (2d Cir. 1992).  For instance, a police officer molesting young women at traffic 
stops and in the police station qualified as obviously wrongful conduct “without 
training or supervision.”  Id. 
 177  See Laurie. L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without 
Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 755, 773–777 (1998-1999). 
 178  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Berg v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d. Cir. 2000)). 
 179  See Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (“Where a plaintiff 
claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has 
caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be 
applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its 
employee.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION  519 (5th ed. 2007) 
(stating that “Brown articulate[d] a heightened requirement for causation, but [did] 
not define it with any precision”). 
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will determine if the propensity to arrest videographers is a “plainly 
obvious consequence” of the government entity’s decision-making 
procedures.180  This attenuated process ultimately circles back to 
searching for a pattern of violations in the past, which, as discussed, 
seems unrelated to the fact that the plaintiff’s rights were violated.181 
Although municipalities may be held liable under some 
circumstances, individual officers may be shielded from liability by 
the doctrine of qualified immunity.182  The qualified-immunity 
doctrine is intended to shield public officials from harassment, 
distraction, and liability when they are legitimately performing their 
duties.183  Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from 
personal liability when their actions arise out of discretionary 
functions.184  To circumvent a police officer’s qualified-immunity 
defense, the plaintiff must show or allege a violation of a “clearly 
established” constitutional right at the time of the police officer’s 
alleged violation.185  Determining if a constitutional right was “clearly 
established” requires two separate inquiries: whether the law was clear 
at the time of the alleged civil rights violation; and whether a 
reasonable police officer would have understood that his conduct 
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.186 
In examining the “clearly established” requirement, the clarity of 
the law at the time of the alleged violation must be narrowly 
determined with respect to the specific facts of the case.187  A broad 
and generalized conceptualization of the law is not sufficient to deny 
an officer qualified immunity.188  This standard, however, does not 
 
 180  See Brown, 520 U.S. at 398–99; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 
(1989). 
 181  See Brown, 520 U.S. at 413–14 (explicating that attempting to determine 
whether the hiring of a particular police officer involved a highly predictable 
consequence, the Court discussed the relevance of the hiree’s background and 
pattern of violence in relation to violating constitutional rights). 
 182  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (using the term “good faith 
immunity” which is synonymous with “qualified immunity”).  A police officer is 
entitled to qualified immunity unless he acted “so obviously wrong, in light of 
preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly 
violating the law would have done such a thing.”  Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ. Bd. of 
Trs., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 183  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 184  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 185  See Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Barton v. 
Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 186  Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269. 
 187  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). 
 188  Id. 
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require that a prior court decision be on point.189  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer established that firm precedent is 
not necessary for a plaintiff to recover against an official.190  The 
reasonableness of a police officer’s actions depends on “whether the 
state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the [officer] 
fair warning that his particular conduct was unconstitutional.”191 
Despite the plaintiff-friendly standard developed in Hope, the 
absence of cases on point is still a basis for dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds.192  In dismissing the claim because of qualified 
immunity in Brosseau v. Haugen, the Supreme Court stressed the lack 
of similar cases where a police officer shot and wounded the plaintiff, 
who alleged that this violated his Fourth Amendment rights.193 The 
Court’s dissension with its own decision in Hope has created 
confusion in lower courts and clouded the “clearly established” 
standard for qualified immunity.194  Often, police officers will have 
qualified immunity, which creates a nearly absolute bar against 
receiving damages from an individual police officer.195  In practice, 
“[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken 
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”196  Essentially, if the law is confusing, 
police officers may be able to invoke qualified immunity.197 
Regarding incidents involving recording police, some courts 
have allowed arresting officers to invoke qualified immunity after 
wrongful conduct.198  An example is Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, where a 
police officer arrested a passenger and seized his camera for filming 
 
 189  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
 190  Id. (declaring that “[a]lthough earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ 
facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly 
established, they are not necessary to such a finding”).  In Hope, the Supreme Court 
found an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff prisoner was tied to a 
hitching post and taunted by police.  Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192  Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). 
 193  Id. at 199–201. 
 194  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 555. 
 195  See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 196  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 197  See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Considering the proliferation of laws and their relative complexity in the context 
of a rapidly changing world, we cannot fairly require police officers in the field to be 
as conversant in the law as lawyers and judges.”). 
 198  See id. at 252; Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
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the officer during a traffic stop.199  Maintaining the officer’s qualified 
immunity, the Third Circuit recognized a broad right to videotape 
police but not a “clearly established” right due to the confusing state 
of the law.200  Because the case law was murky, a reasonably competent 
officer could not be put on “fair notice” that seizing a camera and 
arresting the videographer would violate the First Amendment.201  
Additionally, after the police officer initially seized the passenger’s 
camera, he called the Assistant District Attorney to inquire whether 
the passenger actually violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute.202  
Unfortunately, the Assistant District Attorney misunderstood the law 
and recommended that the police officer arrest the passenger.203  
Although this fact supports the officer’s reasonableness in making the 
final arrest, the officer still seized the camera before contacting the 
local prosecutor.204  If the police officer inquired before confiscating 
the videographer’s camera, it would be difficult to argue that his 
conduct was unreasonable.205  That was not the case, but, 
nevertheless, the police officer was vindicated.206 
In circumstances where a § 1983 litigant is successful, the statute 
permits courts to fashion a range of both legal and equitable 
remedies, but severely limits injunctive relief.207  Specifically, federal 
courts are not in a position to enjoin municipal police departments.208  
 
 199  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251–52 (exemplifying a case where the police officer 
believed the passenger’s conduct violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute). 
 200  Id. at 262. 
 201  Id. at 251–52.   
 202  Id. 
 203  Id.  The assistant district attorney who misunderstood the law would probably 
be shielded from § 1983 liability under the doctrine of absolute immunity for 
officials with prosecutorial functions.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976). 
 204  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252. 
 205  The Third Circuit held that “a police officer who relies in good faith on a 
prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is presumptively 
entitled to qualified immunity.”  Id. at 255–56.  However, the holding applies 
specifically to Fourth Amendment claims premised on lack of probable cause.  Id. at 
256.  Still, the police officer’s reliance on a prosecutor’s advice must be objectively 
reasonable.  Id. 
 206  Id.  Kelly was remanded to allow the plaintiff to rebut the presumption that the 
police officer’s contact with the local prosecutor reasonably justified his conduct.  Id. 
at 266. 
 207  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 208  See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976) (holding that where the 
district court “injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs 
of [the] state agency,” it departed from the principles of federalism “which play such 
an important part in governing the relationship between federal courts” and state 
governments).  But see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012) 
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Without injunctive relief, successful plaintiffs could seek 
compensatory damages for injuries, but in order for the court to 
award damages, the plaintiff must suffer actual harm.209  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has permitted plaintiffs to recover punitive 
damages from individual police officers, but not from 
municipalities.210  However, punitive damages are only available from 
an individual officer where his “conduct is shown to be motivated by 
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous 
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”211 
For videographers whose rights to film have been violated, § 
1983 remedies are not very helpful.  First, losing the ability to film 
does not constitute what is typically considered an “actual injury” 
deserving of compensation.212  In Carey v. Piphus, despite finding that 
the plaintiffs were denied due process when they were wrongly 
suspended from school, the Supreme Court granted only nominal 
damages because the plaintiffs lacked evidence of actual injury.213  
Subsequently, the Court interpreted Carey as denying any concept of 
presumed damages.214  Comparably, in Memphis Community School 
District v. Stachura, the Supreme Court solidified the Carey principle 
when it concluded that damages under § 1983 exist only to 
compensate plaintiffs who are actually injured, noting that “damages 
based on the ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not 
authorized . . . because they are not truly compensatory.”215 
Punitive damages are similarly unattainable because of the 
ambiguous “evil motive or intent” standard, the limitation on 
collecting damages from municipalities, and the likelihood that 
qualified immunity will shield an offending officer.216  Therefore, 
because First Amendment rights such as free speech and news-
gathering cannot be monetized, § 1983 fails to adequately protect 
aggrieved videographers.217 
Although § 1983 initially appears to provide the means for an 
 
(reversing and remanding to the district court with instructions to enjoin law 
enforcement from enforcing the Illinois eavesdropping statute against the ACLU). 
 209  See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). 
 210  City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265 (1981). 
 211  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
 212  See Carey, 435 U.S. at 258. 
 213  Id. at 258. 
 214  Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986). 
 215  Id. at 309 n.13 (citation omitted). 
 216  See supra text accompanying notes 194–95, 208–09. 
 217  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 599. 
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appropriate remedy, it is unworkable for videographers because the 
burden for establishing a municipality’s liability is too heavy, qualified 
immunity shields offending officers, and courts do not provide 
adequate damages when officers violate constitutional rights.  Since 
the likelihood of a plaintiff receiving compensation for his injury is 
rather diminished, it follows that the rules of § 1983 seem to favor 
protecting police officers who did not know or care that a right 
existed over preservation of the right itself.  Absent a prescribed 
remedy for violations, § 1983 fails to safeguard against unreasonable 
law enforcement intrusions.218  Although § 1983 was promulgated to 
address citizens’ grievances for violations of their constitutional 
rights, in the context of citizens filming police, it fails to remedy 
anything, which results in no deterrence for police officers and no 
protection for videographers. 
V.  BRIGHT-LINE RULE: EXPLICITLY STATED REMEDIES AND PERSONAL 
LIABILITY 
The purpose of this Part is to provide a model legislative 
framework for protecting videographers against police harassment.  
First, this Part will discuss the rationale behind the model and how 
the legislation should meet the shortcomings of § 1983 civil rights 
actions.  Then, this Part will present the model legislation itself, 
which state governments could consider, amend, and enact to protect 
videographers from police intimidation. 
A. Considerations in Constructing a Videographer Protection Law 
Police should be deterred from intimidating and harassing 
videographers who film their conduct in public.219  To effectively 
deter police officers, the choice of whether or not to violate an 
individual’s rights must be eliminated from a reasonable police 
officer’s mind.  In deciding whether or not to act in a certain 
situation, a police officer likely balances interests of privacy, safety, 
and self-preservation.  Accordingly, a police officer is effectively 
deterred if in the interest of self-preservation he chooses not to 
violate a videographer’s First Amendment rights. 
 
 218  See Skehill, supra note 14, at 994. 
 219  See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Houston 
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987)) (alluding to society’s expectation that police are to 
endure significant burdens caused by citizens exercising their First Amendment 
rights, Judge Lipez discusses how police are expected to endure criticism and public 
scrutiny while exercising a higher level of restraint than normal citizens). 
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The Framers of the Constitution recognized that police power 
could potentially be abused, and in turn, harm free society.220  
Communities entrust police officers with powers that are sometimes 
abused.221  Permitting individuals to record interactions with police 
without fear of prosecution is essential to balancing the government’s 
need to enforce laws with a citizen’s right to be free from government 
abuse.222  When abuses occur, police officers ought to be fully 
accountable for their actions.223  Protecting certain police interests, 
such as privacy when performing official public functions, is 
“inconsistent with democracy and democratic political accountability” 
when it results in a violation of a private citizen’s guaranteed First 
Amendment rights.224  Police should not be insulated from 
consequences when their conduct is unlawful.225  Instead, police 
officers’ discretionary power should be reduced so that they have less 
of an opportunity to harm citizens’ First Amendment rights without a 
challenge.226 
In the narrow context of protecting citizens who are filming 
police officers in the public discharge of their duties, an effective 
means of deterring police misconduct would be a strict law that 
punishes police officers who harass, intimidate, oppress, or arrest an 
individual because the individual is video-recording police conduct.  
Legislatures, in constructing their respective laws, should weigh 
interests such as police safety, the lawfulness of the videographer’s 
overall conduct, and the general context of the incident.  But to be 
 
 220  See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“Civil liberties, as 
guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society 
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of 
unrestrained abuses.”). 
 221  See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 612–14 (1961) (discussing how 
the Fourth Amendment is a constitutional guarantee against overreaching actions on 
behalf of law enforcement); Morris v. Super. Ct., 129 Cal. Rptr. 238, 243 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1976) (noting how the framers of the Constitution recognized a need for a 
safeguard to protect citizens from “unfettered and unreasonable” police conduct). 
 222  See Skehill, supra note 14, at 993–94. 
 223  Id. at 1011. 
 224  Wasserman, supra note 14, at 650. 
 225  Id. 
 226  See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991) (citing Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58, 361 (1983)) (“[H]istory shows that speech is 
suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of those who enforce 
the law.”); see also King v. Ambs, 519 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2008) (where plaintiff’s 
outrageous conduct while he was filming, but not the filming itself, rendered his 
speech unprotected); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, No. 02-2135, 2008 WL 
2795134 (D. Kan. July 18, 2008) (same). 
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effective, the primary objective of the law must be to protect a 
videographer’s right to be free from police abuse. 
A categorical prohibition on police conduct would be 
problematic because police action against a videographer is 
sometimes appropriate.227  But such circumstances must be narrowly 
construed.  A broad exception based on soft standards like 
“reasonableness” could render the entire law useless.228  To help 
prevent this from happening, legislatures should define possible 
exceptions to the rule as affirmative defenses.229  These exceptions 
could include instances where the videographer was simultaneously 
breaking some other criminal statute or situations where the police 
officer or videographer would be in direct, impending danger 
without the officer’s intervention.230  Under this model, defendant 
police officers carry the burden of proving that their conduct did in 
fact fall within the exception for what otherwise is an unlawful 
violation of a citizen’s First Amendment rights.231 
Since First Amendment limitations—such as time, place, and 
manner restrictions, and murky wiretapping statutes—tend to 
obfuscate the First Amendment, a presumption should exist that 
protects openly filming the police officer’s public conduct.232  This 
presumption would provide the law with a “tie-goes-to-the-runner” 
judgment mechanism which leans toward protecting videographers.233  
“Tie goes to the runner” would mean that where the First 
Amendment right’s existence is subject to close dispute, the conduct 
should go undisturbed by police.  Of course, other conduct unrelated 
to the act of filming may open a videographer to police interference. 
Possible exceptions that allow a police officer to interfere with a 
 
 227  See generally Mishra, supra note 104. 
 228  See S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FC/2012SB-00245-R000271-FC.htm; Timothy B. Lee, 
Hold Cops Personally Liable for Camera Arrests?  Connecticut Bills Says Yes, ARS TECHNICA 
(Apr. 25, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/hold-cops-personally-
liable-for-camera-arrests-connecticut-bill-says-yes/. 
 229  See Conn. S.B. 245; Lee, supra note 228. 
 230  See Conn. S.B. 245; Lee, supra note 228. 
 231  But see Conn. S.B. 245 (Connecticut’s bill does not indicate whether the 
burden of proof rests on the party bringing a claim or the defending peace officer). 
 232  See supra Part II. 
 233  “Tie goes to the runner” refers to an unwritten rule in baseball where if a play 
is so close that an umpire cannot determine whether the base runner was safe before 
a fielder made a tag, the umpire rules in favor of the base runner.  David Wade, 
Inside the Rules: Tie Goes to the Runner, HARDBALL TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, 
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/blog_article/inside-the-rules-tie-goes-to-the-
runner/.  
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videographer’s filming of his conduct, however, should revolve 
around actual, not theoretical, threats to the safety of the 
videographer, the police officer, or other citizens as well as 
enforcement of other citizens’ privacy rights. 
Additionally, for the law to be effective as a deterrent, the 
remedy must be appropriate.  Although the remedy must aim, in 
part, to offer some compensation to the aggrieved videographer, the 
remedy should primarily punish the violating police officer who 
offended the videographer’s First Amendment rights.234  Unless the 
harm to the videographer can actually be categorized under other 
forms of misconduct, such as brutality, the mere intimidation and 
arrest of the videographer should result in direct damages against the 
violating police officers and a short suspension from field duty.  This 
degree of punitive treatment would create a greater deterrent effect 
than internal investigations, which, at times, merely lead to additional 
training without any actual discipline.235 
Besides adequate deterrence, the state laws should also seek to 
fill in the holes left by § 1983 and the federal courts.  Since § 1983 
fails to adequately provide damages for those who suffer no injury 
besides a violated constitutional right, legislatures should incorporate 
liquidated or presumed damages into the statute.236  In terms of 
avoiding problems that qualified immunity causes, automatic liability 
eliminates the shield and simultaneously bypasses the entire debate 
about “clearly established” laws.237  If a state passes the model 
legislation below, the state would essentially remove the narrow issue 
of filming police officers from the complicated and cloudy realms of 
federalism and constitutional law.  Lastly, considering how state 
legislatures may be cautious to micro-manage executive-operated 
agencies, liability for the municipalities is not part of the legislation.  
The rationale for this omission centers around law enforcement’s 
inability to effectively self-police238 and combats individual police 
officers’ temptations to violate videographers’ rights.239 
 
 234  See supra Part II. 
 235  See Press Release, supra note 150 (despite national attention drawn from the 
Good incident, Rochester Police Chief James Sheppard merely indicated that police 
officers would receive additional training and procedural guidance on how to resolve 
similar future incidents but did not state that the offending officers would receive 
any discipline for their misconduct). 
 236  See supra Part IV.C. 
 237  See supra Part IV.C. 
 238  See supra Part IV.B. 
 239  See supra Part III. 
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B. Model “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” 
Below is the “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” or the 
“V.I.P. Act.”  The following is a hypothetical construction of 
legislation that could effectively deter police from violating 
videographers’ First Amendment right to openly film police conduct 
in public: 
Section 1: [Violation] No law enforcement officer, in the 
scope of his or her official duties, shall: 
(a) abridge the right of an individual to video-record 
(including audio) his or her conduct, or the conduct 
of other police officers in a public place; 
(b) harass, intimidate, abuse, question, or arrest any 
private citizen for the purposes of stopping, inhibiting, 
or preventing an individual from recording any law-
enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place; or 
(c) demand or require an individual to turn off his or 
her camera or otherwise stop filming for the purpose 
of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual 
from recording any law enforcement officer’s conduct 
in a public place; 
Section 2: [Defenses] A law enforcement officer may 
present any of the following affirmative defenses: 
(a) The existence of an actual, not theoretical, threat 
of impending harm to the police officer that is 
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming; 
(b) The existence of an actual, not theoretical, threat 
of impending harm to the videographer that is 
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming; 
(c) The existence of an actual, not theoretical, threat 
of impending harm to a nearby third party that is 
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming; 
(d) A valid reason exists to confront the videographer, 
outside of his act of filming, including but not limited 
to a violation of a criminal statute that is unrelated to 
recording a law-enforcement officer’s conduct; or 
(e) Enforcing the privacy rights of private citizens, or a 
criminal anti-wiretapping statute as it pertains to 
private citizens, but not of any public official acting in 
his or her official capacity. 
Section 3: [Evidence] In the event that the law-enforcement 
officer destroys the recording and cannot meritoriously 
assert an affirmative defense, liability is automatically 
attached to the violating law enforcement officer. 
Section 4: [Penalty] Where a law-enforcement officer is 
MURPHY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:33 PM 
2013] COMMENT 355 
 
found to have violated this statute, the law-enforcement 
officer is to be: 
(a) held personally liable, in an action at law, or suit in 
equity, for no less than $1,000 but no more than 
$2,500,240 and 
(b) suspended from public duty for at least three days 
but no more than twenty-one days. 
For inspiration in constructing a “V.I.P. Act,” state legislatures 
could refer to the model act described above,241 or to Connecticut’s 
recently passed “Act Concerning the Recording of Police Activity By 
the Public,” (the “Connecticut Act”).242  The newly passed law, 
effective as of October 1, 2012, provides: 
A peace officer who interferes with any person taking a 
photographic or digital still or video image of such peace 
officer or another peace officer acting in the performance 
of such peace officer’s duties shall . . . be liable to such 
person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper 
proceeding for redress.243 
Additionally, the text of the law provides five broad exceptions to 
liability.244  A police officer, if he or she has “reasonable grounds,” 
may interfere with a videographer in order to: 
(1) [L]awfully enforce a criminal law of [the] state or a 
municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) 
preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal 
investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any 
person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully 
enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with 
respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise 
recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.245 
Many similarities between the Model “V.I.P. Act” and the 
Connecticut Act are plainly visible.  Each is intended to allow 
 
 240   These figures were determined based on median pay for patrol officers in the 
United States.  With the median salary at approximately $50,000 per year, a 
discretionary penalty between two and five percent of annual pay is appropriate for 
deterrence purposes but not devastating to the officer’s well-being.  See Police Patrol 
Officer—U.S. National Averages, SALARY.COM, http://www.salary.com/police-officer-
Salary.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 241  See supra Part V.B. 
 242  S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FC/2012SB-00245-R000271-FC.htm. 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. 
 245  Id. 
MURPHY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:33 PM 
356 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:319 
 
“individuals to bring civil suits against peace officers who interfere 
with the . . . recording of their actions in the course of their duties,” 
and each creates sensible exceptions for officers who act lawfully.246  
The inspiration and reasoning behind the texts are similar as well.  
Connecticut State Senator Eric Coleman, who sponsored the 
Connecticut Act, cited the Rodney King beatings, as well as another 
incident in which a Catholic priest was arrested for filming officers, as 
motivation for developing the legislation.247  Additionally, the 
Connecticut Senate rejected an amendment that would have created 
an exception for police officers arresting an individual whose actions 
caused “inconvenience or alarm.”248  Concerned that the legislation 
would be rendered “toothless,” critics argued that such an exception 
was too broad, and perhaps resembled laws of general applicability.249  
Overall, the Connecticut Act’s inspiration seems aligned with many of 
the concerns that underlie the construction of the “V.I.P. Act.” 
Although the “V.I.P. Act” and the Connecticut Act share many 
elements, one major difference is notable—the Connecticut Act 
embraces indemnification of individual officers whereas the “V.I.P. 
Act” rejects indemnification.250  Connecticut’s legislature 
acknowledges that public servants are generally indemnified from 
civil action and provides, in its explanation, that the Connecticut Act 
potentially creates civil actions where the “law enforcement agency is 
liable for damages and legal costs.”251  In effect, the Connecticut Act 
permits a state form of qualified immunity to persist because it 
provides that “[o]fficers found liable . . . are entitled . . . to 
indemnification (repayment) . . . if they were acting within their 
scope of authority and the conduct was not willful, wanton, or 
reckless.”252  While the Connecticut Act’s construction is subject to the 
Connecticut legislature’s discretion, state-acknowledged 
indemnification and repayment to violating officers may render the 
Connecticut Act less potent than it otherwise could be.253 
 
 246  Id. 
 247  See Lee, supra note 228; see also supra Part IV.A. 
 248  Lee, supra note 228; see supra Part III. 
 249  Lee, supra note 228; see supra Part III. 
 250  S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FC/2012SB-00245-R000271-FC.htm; see supra Part IV.C, 
V.A–B. 
 251  Conn. S.B. 245. 
 252  Id. 
 253  See supra Part IV.C. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A First Amendment right to film police officers in public exists 
and should be universally protected.254  From case law and scholarly 
legal commentary, it is more than reasonable to conclude that the 
right exists and, subject to some narrow limitations, should not be 
abridged.255  However, individuals’ First Amendment rights are 
sometimes violated.256  This occurs because police officers have 
interests in resisting the legal trend that private citizens have a right 
to film police officers in public.257 
Police frequently escape liability when they abuse their power 
because the legal landscape is proving to be an enabling 
environment.258  That environment, combined with the growing 
widespread availability of video-recording devices, has resulted in 
police officers abusing their power in an effort to chill videographers’ 
actions.259  The current framework of deterrence fails to address this 
chilling effect adequately.260  Since the deterrents are too weak, or too 
avoidable, officers can often abuse their power without 
punishment.261 
To resolve this problem, legislatures should pass a stricter law 
which directly targets and prevents police officers from interfering 
with videographers filming police conduct.262  Had a safeguard been 
enacted, perhaps citizens like Emily Good would not have been 
falsely arrested for openly and unobtrusively monitoring police in the 
public discharge of their duties.263 
 
 
 254  See supra Part II. 
 255  See supra Part II. 
 256  See supra Parts II–IV. 
 257  See supra Part III. 
 258  See supra Part IV. 
 259  See supra Parts II–IV. 
 260  See supra Part IV. 
 261  See supra Part IV. 
 262  See supra Part V. 
 263  See supra Part V. 
